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INTRODUCTION 
 
This Essay addresses a new economic and human right the Euro-
pean Union has included in a Draft Regulation1 that would bind all its 
Member States: the right to data portability (“RDP”).2  The basic idea 
of the RDP is that an individual would be able to transfer his or her 
personal data and other material from one information service to an-
other without hindrance.3  A core example, referenced in the explan-
atory materials to the Draft Regulation, is for consumers to control 
the material they have posted to a social networking site such as Face-
                                                          
 1.  Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and On the Free Movement 
of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 18, at 53, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 
2012) [hereinafter “Draft Regulation”]. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
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book.4  In this example, the right would require it to be easy for users 
to transfer their photos, videos, and status updates to another social 
networking site.5 
We emphasize at the outset that the idea of data portability is ap-
pealing.6  As consumers, we like the convenience of easily moving all 
of “our” stuff to a new service if we so choose.7  The RDP as defined in 
Article 18 of the Draft Regulation, however, is unprecedented and 
problematic.  The new RDP provides the user (called the “data sub-
ject” under E.U. law)8 the right to obtain data “in an electronic and 
structured format which is commonly used and allows for further use 
by the data subject.”9  Article 18, in many settings, also requires in-
formation in an automated processing system to be transferred “in an 
electronic format which is commonly used, without hindrance” from 
the entity operating the system directly to another entity.10  We intro-
duce the term “export-import module” (“EIM”) to highlight the un-
precedented nature of the RDP.11  As drafted, Article 18 often re-
quires an online service to write specialized code (the EIM) that will 
export the data from that service and import it into a second service.12  
The text of Article 18 is in no way limited to social networks; its lan-
                                                          
 4.  Id. at 26. 
 5.  Id.  Even in the absence of legal requirements, Facebook has now provided a tool 
to enable consumers to download all of their data in a single computer file.  Matthew Rog-
ers, Facebook to Allow Users to Download Their Data, SWITCHED DOWNLOADSQUAD (Oct. 7, 
2010, 4:40 AM), http://downloadsquad.switched.com/2010/10/07/facebook-to-allow-
users-to-download-their-data/. 
 6.  See, e.g., Vision & Mission, DATAPORTABILITY PROJECT (Mar. 19, 2009), http://wiki. 
dataportability.org/pages/viewpage.action;jsessionid=2EDEAF2341B315BA17520E6301ED 
C4E9?pageId=3440714 (last visited Oct. 4, 2012) (explaining the convenience of data 
portability). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  This Essay will use the terms “user,” “consumer,” and “data subject” interchangea-
bly. 
 9.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1), at 53. 
 10.  Id. art. 18(2), at 53. 
 11.  See discussion infra Parts I.B.1, II–IV. 
 12.  See Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1), at 53 (giving data subjects the right 
to obtain their data in a commonly used format). 
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guage applies generally to cloud computing, web services, 
smartphone apps, and other automated data processing systems.13 
More generally, data portability can address a “lock-in” or high 
switching costs problem—users start to use one service, such as Face-
book, and then find it costly or technically difficult to shift to another 
service, even if they prefer the other service.14  One rationale for a le-
gal right to portability in such instances would be to reduce monopoly 
power and improve competition in the market, so that new services 
can innovate and attract customers away from the original service.15  
Within E.U. law, an important additional rationale for the RDP is to 
implement human rights related to privacy (generally called “data 
protection” in the E.U.).16  The drafters of the RDP justify it as build-
ing on fundamental data protection rights included in earlier Euro-
pean legal instruments, such as the 1995 Data Protection Directive.17  
Proponents would include the new rights created by the Draft Regula-
tion as fundamental rights under E.U. law.18  In addition to competi-
tion law and fundamental rights, interoperability is an additional pos-
sible argument in favor of Article 18. 
While we underscore our hope that major online services will 
provide data portability in many settings, we nonetheless write this Es-
say to express serious concerns about the RDP as drafted.  A principal 
reason for our concern is that Article 18 is a bad fit with U.S. antitrust 
and E.U. competition law.19  The concerns about lock-in and high 
switching costs have been extensively addressed in antitrust law.20  
One crucial requirement in competition law is that market domi-
                                                          
 13.  See Gabriela Zanfir, The Right to Data Portability in the Context of the EU Data Protection 
Reform, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 149, 149 (2012) (discussing Article 18’s application to 
cloud computing). 
 14.  Id. at 152. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 17.  Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 12, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 42 (EC) [hereinafter 
Council Directive 95/46/EC]; see also Draft Regulation, supra note 1 (noting the 1995 di-
rective and recognizing that further initiatives might be necessary). 
 18.  Zanfir, supra note 13, at 151. 
 19.  See infra Part II. 
 20.  ANDREJ FATUR, EU COMPETITION LAW AND THE INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY NETWORK INDUSTRIES: ECONOMIC VERSUS LEGAL 
CONCEPTS IN PURSUIT OF (CONSUMER) WELFARE 86–87 (2012). 
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nance must be shown, typically by demonstrating high market share.21  
The text of Article 18, however, applies to a start-up software company 
in a garage just as it does to a monopolist.  In examining the best 
means to achieve the goal of consumer welfare, the U.S. and the E.U. 
have a nuanced application of the rule of reason, not the per se re-
quirements of Article 18.22  Competition law, not Article 18, would 
consider the many efficiencies that result from a service provider de-
ciding what functions to include in its products, which undergo rapid 
innovation.23 
Another concern is that Article 18 suffers from serious difficulties 
regarding privacy or data protection law.24  No jurisdiction has exper-
imented with anything resembling the proposed Article 18, casting se-
rious doubt on its status as a new human right protecting privacy.25  
Among other difficulties, Article 18 poses serious risks to a long-
established E.U. fundamental right of data protection: the right to se-
curity of a person’s data.26  Previous access requests by individuals 
were limited in scope and format.27  By contrast, when an individual’s 
lifetime of data must be exported “without hindrance,” one moment 
of identity fraud can turn into a lifetime breach of personal data.28 
A final concern with Article 18 is that the affirmative mandate to 
create an EIM goes far beyond previous law relating to interoperabil-
ity, in both the U.S. and E.U., where the second service is permitted 
to write interoperable code, despite objections by the first service.29  
                                                          
 21.  Id. at 247. 
 22.  See, e.g., id. at 162; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 94 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (noting that the rule of reason is better suited to an appropriate balancing of bene-
fits and costs than a per se rule). 
 23.  See infra Part II.B. 
 24.  See infra Part III. 
 25.  See infra Part III.B. 
 26.  See infra Part III.B. 
 27.  See infra Part III.B. 
 28.  See infra Part III.C. 
 29.  See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d, 
516 U.S. 233 (1996) (explaining that a method of operation, or the way a system is used, 
can be employed and explained by other users in their own words, and is thus “uncopy-
rightable”); Council Directive 91/250/EEC, art. 6, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 45 [hereinafter 
Council Directive 91/250/EEC] (stating that permission from the first service need not be 
sought when it is necessary to reproduce and translate code to achieve interoperability); 
Case C-406/10, SAS Inst. Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., 2011 E.C.R. I-13, ¶ 61 (finding 
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The new, mandated code must also perform at a high level of in-
teroperability, transferring the data “without hindrance.”30  In prac-
tice, achieving interoperability is often a difficult task, requiring tai-
lored code to interact with different recipients.31  But the RDP puts a 
new obligation on the first service to write the EIM and meet that am-
bitious standard.32 
Part I of the Article explains the RDP as contained in the Draft 
Data Protection Regulation issued by the European Commission in 
January, 2012.  The RDP would apply both within the E.U. and to 
online services globally that sell in the E.U.33  Part II analyzes the RDP 
under antitrust or competition law.  A key finding is that the RDP, de-
signed to help consumers, appears to reduce consumer welfare as un-
derstood in competition law.  Competition law, in both the U.S. and 
E.U., recognizes important efficiencies that can occur from lock-in for 
some situations; notably, a certain level of switching costs can encour-
age investment in new products and services, creating efficiency over 
time.34  In addition, the Draft Regulation as written can reduce in-
teroperability by creating an incentive to use non-standard formats; 
only “standard and commonly used” formats trigger the RDP re-
quirements.35 
Part III analyzes the RDP as an expansion of human rights from a 
data protection and privacy perspective.  With the absence of previous 
experimentation with data portability rules, and no consensus among 
experts about best practices, it is risky to lock in sweeping new re-
quirements.36 Part IV examines the RDP in light of other interopera-
bility law, including Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International37 
                                                          
that the “functionality of a computer program reproduced in another computer program” 
is not a copyright violation). 
 30.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(2), at 53. 
 31.  Rajiv Shah & Jay P. Kesan, Lost in Translation: Interoperability Issues for Open Stand-
ards, 8 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y 113, 113 (2012). 
 32.  See infra Part IV. 
 33.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3(2), at 41. 
 34.  See FATUR, supra note 20, at 176 (“[T]he core issue with regard to imposing a duty 
to deal is balancing short-run gains in efficiency with long-run incentives to invest and 
compete dynamically, which should be done on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 35.  See infra Part II.B. 
 36.  See infra Part III.B. 
 37.  49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). 
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and the E.U. Computer Programs Directive,38 and shows that the pro-
posed RDP goes considerably beyond previous interoperability re-
quirements.39  The general conclusion is that the RDP deserves care-
ful attention from academics and policymakers, both within the E.U. 
and elsewhere, and that a sweeping or badly implemented version of 
the RDP could cause significant harm. 
I.  ARTICLE 18: THE RIGHT TO DATA PORTABILITY 
This Part examines the text of Article 18, which defines the RDP.  
Three examples then illustrate the sorts of interpretive challenges fac-
ing the Commission and the many software and Internet service com-
panies that would be required to comply with the RDP. 
A.  The Text of Article 18 
The European Commission on January 25, 2012 proposed 
changes to the current regulatory framework protecting the personal 
data of individuals (the “Draft Regulation”).40  Among those protec-
tions is the RDP.41  This Essay is concerned with Article 18’s require-
ments on companies to transfer consumer data.42  More specifically, 
the Commission’s example of transfer of data between social networks 
illustrates the goal of the RDP.  The Draft Regulation cites the exam-
ple of a social network as a rationale for Article 18: “The data subject 
should . . . be allowed to transmit those data, which they have provid-
ed, from one automated application, such as a social network, into 
another one.”43  For this core example, a Facebook user would have 
the right to export the data governed by Article 18 to the user or an-
other social network.   
                                                          
 38.  Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 17. 
 39.  See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815–16 (holding that a program’s menu command hierarchy 
was not subject to copyright, even though programmers may have made some expressive 
choices in developing the menu functions); Council Directive 91/250/EEC, supra note 29 
(stating that the original programmer’s permission is not needed when reproducing or 
translating code is necessary for interoperability). 
 40.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, at 1. 
 41.  Id. art. 18, at 53. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 26. 
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Article 18 is divided into three parts.  Paragraph 1 gives consum-
ers the right to download personal data,44 which is defined broadly 
under E.U. law as “any information relating to a data subject.”45  The 
right applies to personal data “processed by electronic means and in a 
structured and commonly used format.”46  For this personal data, 
which we will refer to as “covered personal data,” the organization 
that controls the data, such as the social network, must provide a copy 
of the covered data to the data subject.47  The copy must be “in an 
electronic and structured format which is commonly used and allows 
for further use by the data subject.”48  In short, the user (called the 
“data subject” under E.U. law) has a right of data portability—a right 
to get a copy of the covered data in an easy-to-use format.  For in-
stance, a Facebook user would have a legal right to export his or her 
covered data in a form that is usable in another social network.49 
Paragraph 2 gives consumers the right to transfer personal data 
and “other information” provided by the consumer in a commonly 
used format “without hindrance” from one processing system to an-
other.50  This paragraph differs in four important respects from Para-
                                                          
 44.  Id. art. 18(1), at 53.  Paragraph 1 states in full: 
The data subject shall have the right, where personal data are processed by elec-
tronic means and in a structured and commonly used format, to obtain from the 
controller a copy of data undergoing processing in an electronic and structured 
format which is commonly used and allows for further use by the data subject. 
Id. 
 45.  Id. art. 4(2), at 41; see also Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Pri-
vacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1873 
(2011) (“[T]he European Union takes an expansionist approach to [personally identifia-
ble information].”). 
 46.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1), at 53. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  See supra note 5. 
 50.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(2), at 53.  Paragraph 2 states in full: 
Where the data subject has provided the personal data and the processing is 
based on consent or on a contract, the data subject shall have the right to trans-
mit those personal data and any other information provided by the data subject 
and retained by an automated processing system, into another one, in an elec-
tronic format which is commonly used, without hindrance from the controller 
from whom the personal data are withdrawn. 
Id. 
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graph 1.  First, it goes beyond the requirement to provide data to the 
data subject.  It requires the first party, such as Facebook, to export 
the data directly to other websites, such as another social network.51  
Second, it requires data transfer to another processing system in a 
commonly used format “without hindrance.”52  Although the term 
“without hindrance” is not further defined in the Draft Regulation, 
the language suggests a strong obligation on the first party to have the 
export work smoothly.  Third, Paragraph 2 extends not only to “per-
sonal data” but also to “other information” provided by the user.53  
Fourth, Paragraph 2 does not limit itself to data already stored in “a 
structured and commonly used format,” as does Paragraph 1.54  The 
right to export data applies to “any other information provided by the 
data subject.”55 
To further define the obligations of Article 18, Paragraph 3 vests 
considerable power in the Commission to determine the scope of Ar-
ticle 18.56  We are not aware of any legislation in effect that imple-
ments anything like Article 18.  Given that the Draft Regulation uses 
terms new to legislation, there is considerable uncertainty about the 
meaning of the RDP as defined in Article 18. 
B.  Defining Key Terms in Article 18 
The novelty of Article 18, and the varying interpretations that can 
be given to its key terms, makes it difficult to gauge how broadly or 
narrowly the text will be interpreted.  This Essay critically examines 
the possible rationales for and effects of Article 18.  If Article 18 is in-
terpreted broadly and enforced vigorously, then we believe there 
could be quite substantial effects on online software and services.  No-
tably, as discussed in Part II, the current text of Article 18 can be in-
                                                          
 51.  Compare id. art. 18(1), at 53, with id. art. 18(2), at 53. 
 52.  Id. art. 18(2), at 53. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Compare id. art. 18(1), at 53, with id. art. 18(2), at 53. 
 55.  Id. art. 18(2), at 53. 
 56.  Id. art. 18(3), at 53.  Paragraph 3 states in full: 
The Commission may specify the electronic format referred to in paragraph 1 
and the technical standards, modalities and procedures for the transmission of 
personal data pursuant to paragraph 2.  Those implementing acts shall be 
adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 
87(2). 
Id. 
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terpreted to be substantially at variance with how E.U. competition 
law assesses similar practices.  By contrast, a narrow interpretation of 
Article 18, or decisions by data protection authorities not to enforce 
vigorously, would mean that the RDP creates few new issues—it would 
not be a major departure from the status quo. 
We hope readers will understand this Essay as a useful attempt to 
analyze both the theoretical and practical implications of the innova-
tive provisions of Article 18.  The issues raised here may be helpful in 
considering whether to amend the current text of Article 18 before 
the Draft Regulation becomes final.  The analysis may also be useful 
to the Commission and interested persons in subsequent proceedings 
under the authority delegated by Paragraph 3.57  We now turn to the 
possible narrow and broad interpretations of three key terms: (1) 
“without hindrance”; (2) “other information”; and (3) “structured 
and commonly used format.”58 
1.  Export “Without Hindrance” and the Requirement to Write an 
Export-Import Module 
Under Paragraph 2, users have the right to transfer their data 
“without hindrance” to the data subject or another online service.59  
Interpretation of “without hindrance” will substantially determine the 
reach of Article 18.  Quite possibly, under a broad reading that seems 
supported by the text, Article 18 requires an online service to write 
what we refer to as an “export-import module” (“EIM”).  The EIM 
signifies the software code and services that will export the data from 
the first service and import it into a second service.  The EIM software 
that works “without hindrance” would presumably meet the European 
e-Government initiative’s definition of “interoperability,” or “the abil-
ity of information and communication technology (ICT) systems . . . 
to exchange data and enable the sharing of information and 
knowledge.”60  A strong form of interoperability would enable con-
sumers to transfer data seamlessly from one platform to another.61  
                                                          
 57.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(3), at 53. 
 58.  Id. art. 18, at 53. 
 59.  Id. art. 18(2), at 53. 
 60.  Interoperability, IDABC EUROPEAN EGOVERNMENT SERVICES, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
idabc/en/chapter/5883.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
 61.  See JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, INTEROP: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF HIGHLY 
INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS 23–24 (2012) [hereinafter PALFREY & GASSER, INTEROP] (dis-
cussing the seamless transfer of information).  Palfrey and Gasser emphasize downsides as 
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Such interoperability, however, is not free, and all consumer online 
services operating in the E.U. would apparently need to develop an 
EIM. 
Under a narrower interpretation of “without hindrance,” the 
RDP would not place an affirmative obligation on the controlling 
website to transfer data directly to data subjects and other websites in-
cluding competitors.  Instead, the RDP would primarily seek to pre-
vent a first party from technically blocking the transfer of data to a 
second party.  This interpretation would reduce the cost on the first 
party because it would not need to develop an EIM to transport data 
to competitors.  The text of Article 18, however, may not be consistent 
with this narrow reading.  The language appears to impose an affirm-
ative obligation on the first party to provide software that accomplish-
es the goal of exporting the data easily for the data subject. 
2.  Defining “Structured and Commonly Used Formats” 
The right to data portability in Paragraph 1 applies only to data 
“processed by electronic means and in a structured and commonly 
used format.”62  The Commission is specifically granted the authority 
to define what formats meet this definition.63  “Structured” and 
“commonly used” are apparently two distinct formatting requirements 
and both must be satisfied before consumers can realize their right to 
data portability. 
Structured data formats allow for increased functionality and eas-
ier data transfer.64  Tim Berners-Lee is one advocate for greater use of 
                                                          
well as upsides of interoperability. We note that we received this book only after the ideas 
in this Essay were mostly developed and presented publicly, although we did read and 
benefit from the following article while developing this Essay: Urs Gasser & John Palfrey, 
Breaking Down Digital Barriers: When and How ICT Interoperability Drives Innovation, THE 
BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (2007) [hereinafter Gasser & Palfrey, Breaking 
Down], available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interop/pdfs/interop-breaking-barriers. 
pdf. 
 62.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1), at 53.  Paragraph 3 specifically grants 
the Commission the power to define what counts as the “structured and commonly used 
formats” covered by Paragraph 1.  Id. art. 18(3), at 53.  The absence of a cross-reference to 
Paragraph 2 supports the view that Paragraph 2 applies and its reference to “other infor-
mation” is not limited to “structured and commonly used formats.”  Id. art. 18, at 53. 
 63.  Id. art. 18(3), at 53. 
 64.  See Adam Cheyer & Joshua Levy, A Collaborative Programming Environment for Web 
Interoperability, SRI INT’L ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CTR., http://www.ai.sri.com/pubs/files 
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structured data formats.  He supports the idea of a semantic web, or a 
“World Wide Web that enables people to share content beyond the 
boundaries of applications and websites.”65  To achieve the semantic 
web, websites would convert from using unstructured formats such as 
PDF, where words, data, and pictures all appear essentially as one im-
age on a page; instead, websites would rely on structured formats such 
as RDL/XML, so that statistical and other information is exported to 
a new service in a way that allows automatic processing.66  Currently, 
there is no easy tool for determining what formats count as struc-
tured.  The standard-setting goals of the Internet Engineering Task 
Force, for instance, do not include a structured format.67  The Com-
mission will thus have to develop the expertise to determine over time 
which formats are sufficiently structured. 
Once the Commission decides that a format is structured, it must 
still determine whether a format is commonly used.68  A structured 
format is not necessarily commonly used—there are many standards 
that are not widely adopted.69  The difficulty of finding the actual us-
age of a format will further complicate the Commission’s task.  It may 
be difficult enough for the Commission to assess the number of sales 
of a software package or downloads from a site.  It is even more diffi-
                                                          
/1272.pdf (describing the need to convert unstructured data formats into more structured 
formats to enhance interoperability). 
 65.  Main Page, SEMANTICWEB.ORG, http://semanticweb.org/wiki/Main_Page (last vis-
ited Nov. 12, 2012) (emphasis omitted). 
 66.  See W3C Semantic Web Frequently Asked Questions, SEMANTICWEB.ORG, 
http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/SW-FAQ#Manual (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (explaining that 
a goal of the Semantic Web is to convert existing internet data into one common form, in 
this case RDF); How Do PDF Files Work?, NUANCE, http://www.nuance.com/imaging/ 
resources/userGuides/pdfconverter/chapter5/ch5_6.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (“PDF 
documents present their pages as images.”); see also Introduction to RDF, W3SCHOOLS.COM, 
http://www.w3schools.com/rdf/rdf_intro.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2012) (explaining that 
RDF/XML information can be easily exchanged between different computers running 
different operating systems and application languages). 
 67.  See The IETF Standards Process, THE INTERNET ENG’G TASK FORCE, http://www.ietf. 
org/about/standards-process.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2012) (“The goals of the Internet 
Standards Process are: technical excellence; prior implementation and testing; clear, con-
cise, and easily understood documentation; openness and fairness; and timeliness.”). 
 68.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(3), at 53. 
 69.  For example, the IETF standard setting process does not include a widely adopted 
requirement.  See supra note 67. 
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cult to measure the extent to which consumers actually use the for-
mat.70 
3.  The Amount of Data Covered by the RDP 
Defining what data is covered by the RDP is vital for organiza-
tions that must comply with portability requests.  An area of uncer-
tainty in the Draft Regulation is the definition of “other information 
provided by the data subject” in Paragraph 2.71 
Website controllers maintain numerous types of data on con-
sumers.  On the one end, consumers directly upload data to a web 
service.  Examples include uploaded photos and information a user 
has typed into a site, such as status updates or profile information.72  
Direct uploads, where users supply the information, presumably fall 
within the definition of “other information.”73  On the other end, 
companies keep many kinds of metadata and analytics about usage of 
a website, some of which is aggregated to the point where there is no 
feasible link back to the individual user.74  Data that is truly created by 
the site, for operational or analytic purposes, presumably does not fall 
within the definition of “other information provided by the data sub-
ject.”75 
Between the two ends lies a continuum with no natural line of 
demarcation.  A large portion of the data on the Internet comes from 
a combination of the consumer and the controller’s website.  Face-
                                                          
 70.  See, e.g., Josh Catone, Google Docs Use: Just a Blip, SITEPOINT (Nov. 15, 2008), 
http://www.sitepoint.com/google-docs-use-just-a-blip/ (discussing how “58% of unique 
visitors to Google Docs and Spreadsheets in September 2008 never actually touched the 
applications themselves”). 
 71.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(2), at 53. 
 72.  See, e.g., Downloading Your Information, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help 
/?page=116481065103985 (last visited Oct. 4, 2012) (discussing the different types of data 
consumers can already download from Facebook). 
 73.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(2), at 53. 
 74.  See How to Prepare Your Organization for the Metadata Era, VARONIS, 
www.varonis.com/pdfs/howtoprepare-metadata-era.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2012) (noting 
that organizations that store data often break that data in “containers” or “folders” that 
can contain data from dozens of users).  Metadata is generally defined as data about data 
and is used by technology companies to manage data: “[W]e need metadata that will help 
us determine, for example, who it belongs to, [who] has access to it, who uses it, and what 
kind of content it contains.”  Id. 
 75.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(2), at 53. 
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book’s friend list provides an example of this middle area.76  Users 
choose their Facebook friends, but Facebook may have a wide range 
of related data, such as current friends, close friends, acquaintances 
pending requests for friendship, declined friendship requests, and 
“defriended” friends.77  An online game such as World of Warcraft 
provides another example.78 Consumers develop individualized ava-
tars that embark on unique quests, but such creations are done using 
World of Warcraft software.79  If the avatars in the game meet the oth-
er requirements for the RDP, then it may be a complex task to deter-
mine what information was “provided by the data subject.”80  Some-
how, the legal implementation of Article 18 will need to provide 
guidance on how to handle the nuanced issues regarding information 
that is provided at least in part by both the data subject and the con-
troller, apparently for a huge number of different websites and apps. 
Article 18 also fails to address how the RDP would apply in con-
nection with intellectual property rights or claims by multiple indi-
viduals to have control over information.  The RDP’s requirement to 
export “other information” may conflict, for instance, with a license 
that limits the data subject from copying songs, photographs, or other 
content.  Internet services themselves may have intellectual property 
and similar restrictions on what may be downloaded.  Facebook, for 
example, restricts users from downloading any information “which is 
a trade secret or intellectual property of Facebook Ireland Limited or 
its licensors.”81  More generally, multiple individuals may have “other 
information” about them, such as when multiple people appear in a 
photograph. Allowing one user to transfer a second user’s infor-
mation may violate the privacy rights of the second user.82 Controlling 
websites may thus find it difficult to determine what “other infor-
                                                          
 76.  See Lists for Friends, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/friends/lists (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2012) (describing the way friends lists can be further subdivided by Face-
book users). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  WORLD OF WARCRAFT, http://us.battle.net/wow/en/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). 
 79.  What Is World of Warcraft?, WORLD OF WARCRAFT, http://us.battle.net/wow/en/ 
game/guide/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
 80.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(2), at 53. 
 81.  Emil Protalinsk, Facebook: Releasing Your Personal Data Reveals Our Trade Secrets, 
ZDNET (Oct. 12, 2011, 11:27 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/facebook-
releasing-your-personal-data-reveals-our-trade-secrets/4552. 
 82.  Thanks to James Grimmelmann who expressed this idea to Tal Zarsky. 
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mation” may legally be transferred on behalf of a particular data sub-
ject. 
The discussion here has presented three examples of as-yet unde-
fined terms under Article 18: “without hindrance”, “structured and 
commonly used format[s]”, and “other information provided by the 
data subject.”83  Experience with Article 18 may reveal other textual 
challenges.  As with any legal regime based on novel terms, there 
would appear to be a great deal of uncertainty about how the full 
range of software and Internet service providers are expected to com-
ply with the RDP.  Perhaps most importantly, controllers will need 
guidance on the scope of the new mandate for them to write the soft-
ware for the Export-Import Module.84  The Draft Regulation also con-
tains enhanced penalties that can reach two percent of a company’s 
global revenue.85  The prospect of large penalties, combined with 
genuine uncertainty about the RDP’s meaning, makes it important to 
scrutinize the proposed RDP carefully.  The rest of this Essay will ex-
plore the problems that can arise from a broad interpretation of the 
RDP. 
II.  THE RDP AND COMPETITION LAW 
A core argument for the RDP is the fear of lock-in, the idea that 
consumers will continue to use an inferior product because of high 
switching costs.86  This Part of the Essay analyzes the RDP under E.U. 
competition law and U.S. antitrust law, which we refer to generally 
here as “competition law.”  The conclusion is striking: The RDP as 
proposed is far broader than competition law would support.  The 
chief goal of competition law is to increase consumer welfare.87  At 
least as understood in competition law, the proposed RDP is consid-
                                                          
 83.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1)–(2), at 53. 
 84.  See supra Part I.B.1. 
 85.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 79, at 92–94. 
 86.  See James F. Ponsoldt & Christopher D. David, A Comparison Between U.S. and E.U. 
Antitrust Treatment of Tying Claims Against Microsoft: When Should the Bundling of Computer 
Software Be Permitted?, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 421, 448 (2007) (discussing lock-in and its 
effects on the software industry). 
 87.  See FATUR, supra note 20, at 137 (“[EU competition policy] acknowledges the im-
portance of consumer welfare.”); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993) (recognizing “the antitrust laws’ traditional concern for 
consumer welfare and price competition”). 
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erably over-broad and appears to reduce consumer welfare.88  Alt-
hough there may be other justifications for the RDP, Article 18 as 
drafted is contrary to the teachings of competition law. 
In competition law, a successful case would need to establish 
three elements: dominant market power, an exclusionary practice, 
and no efficiencies to offset the harms of the exclusionary practice.89  
Compared with these basic requirements of an antitrust claim, the 
RDP is over-broad.  It applies even in the absence of market power.  It 
does not take into consideration the substantial efficiency arguments 
that apply in many settings.  Additionally, under European law for ex-
clusionary practices, it would often be quite difficult to show the main 
types of exclusionary practices, such as a refusal to supply, denial of 
access to an essential facility, or a tying violation.90 
Put another way, the RDP essentially creates a per se rule for the 
cases covered by the RDP—for these cases, the Draft Regulation pro-
hibits software unless it has an EIM.91  Current E.U. and U.S. competi-
tion law, however, applies the rule of reason to exclusionary conduct 
rather than a per se rule.  For those not familiar with competition law, 
that means that enforcement is case by case, and depends on the effi-
ciencies of the action as well as the possible harm to competition.92  
This departure from E.U. and U.S. competition law does not in itself 
mean that the RDP is flawed.  It does mean, however, that lock-in ef-
fects and high switching costs do not justify the proposed RDP.  When 
tested against modern understandings of competition law, the RDP as 
drafted goes far beyond the rules that competition law would apply to 
lock-in and switching costs, in ways that reduce consumer welfare. 
This Part explores the differences between the RDP and current 
competition law.  First, the RDP does not require a showing of market 
power and applies equally to monopolies and to small and medium 
                                                          
 88.  See Commission Communication on Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in 
Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 
2009/C 45/02, ¶¶ 86–88 [hereinafter Guidance] (recognizing that consumers may be 
harmed when service providers are prevented from innovating or are excluded from the 
market due to price constraints). 
 89.  Id. ¶¶ 9–31. 
 90.  See id. ¶¶ 47–62, 75–90 (discussing various anticompetitive actions and how they 
would be dealt with under the Draft Regulation). 
 91.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18, at 53; see also supra Part I.B.1. 
 92.  See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 34, 34, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 
FATUR, supra note 20, at 162. 
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enterprises.93  Second, the RDP uses a per se approach that does not 
compare the precompetitive efficiencies against the harms to compe-
tition.94  Third, failure to write EIM software does not fit under the 
traditional categories of exclusionary conduct prohibited by current 
competition law.95 
A.  Market Power and Effects on Small and Medium Enterprises 
Competition law leads to enforcement only when market power 
exists: “A finding of dominance in general, and a high market share 
in particular, serves as an initial screen to identify market conduct 
which may potentially be harmful.”96  Where there is no market pow-
er, consumers and the market are not harmed by the actions of one 
company—the company by definition cannot exercise monopoly 
power.97  In the E.U., the Commission strongly presumes that compa-
nies with less than a forty percent market share do not dominate a 
market, and so are exempted from competition enforcement.98  The 
required showing of market power, to trigger possible enforcement, is 
generally even higher in the U.S.99  In addition to high market share, 
substantial barriers to entry must exist for a company to possess mar-
ket power.100 
The Draft Regulation applies the RDP even in the absence of 
market power.  Any company that meets the other criteria of standard 
format and electronic processing, for example, comes within the re-
quirements of the RDP.101  This simple fact is a major departure from 
competition law.  Applying the RDP in the absence of market power 
signals that the monopoly power problems of lock-in alone do not jus-
                                                          
 93.  See infra Part II.A. 
 94.  See infra Part II.B. 
 95.  See infra Part II.C. 
 96.  FATUR, supra note 20, at 246. 
 97.  See id. (discussing the effects-based approach). 
 98.  Guidance, supra note 88, ¶ 14. 
 99.  E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 450-51 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (“Supreme Court cases, as well as cases from this court, suggest that absent spe-
cial circumstances, a defendant must have a market share of at least 50 percent before he 
can be guilty of monopolization.”). 
 100.  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54-55 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 101.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18, at 53. 
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tify the proposal as drafted.102  By not requiring market power, the 
RDP imposes obligations on numerous companies without a corre-
sponding consumer benefit. 
Competition law requires market power before enforcing against 
even very large companies.103  Competition agencies are even less like-
ly to bring enforcement actions against small and medium-sized en-
terprises (“SMEs”).104  Yet the RDP as drafted applies to SMEs the 
same as it does to large software companies.105  Mandating the RDP 
for SMEs, in the name of preventing lock-ins, has at least three major 
disadvantages.  First, SMEs rarely, if ever, have market power.  Second, 
the compliance burdens on SMEs are likely to be substantial relative 
to the benefits.  Under the RDP as drafted, a start-up in a garage 
would appear to have the same responsibility to create an EIM as a 
large company.106  A large company may have enough software writers 
and compliance lawyers on staff to build and test the EIM to meet the 
Article 18 requirements.  SMEs are far less likely to have the resources 
to learn their compliance obligations and write software to meet 
them.  The third disadvantage follows from the first two: Innovation 
by small software companies will be discouraged if they must write an 
EIM from the start and comply with the RDP.107  The concern is that 
the RDP, rather than promoting consumer welfare, would deprive 
                                                          
 102.  Put another way, competition law would not find an enforceable harm in the ab-
sence of market power.  See supra note 96 and accompanying text.  A proponent of the 
RDP as drafted would thus need to have factual views about markets that are quite differ-
ent from the views of the competition enforcement agencies.  Presumably, a heavy burden 
should be on proponents to make the case that markets affected by the RDP are so far at 
variance with the competition agencies’ understanding of markets.  To date, proponents 
have not made any such case. 
 103.  The test in both the U.S. and E.U. is market share and not market size.  Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d at 54; E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 637 F.3d at 450-51. 
 104.  Cf. supra note 98 and accompanying text (explaining that the E.U. will not pre-
sume market competition violations where a company has less than a forty percent market 
share). 
 105.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, at 19. 
 106.  See id. (applying the Draft Regulation to “micro, small and medium-sized enter-
prises”). 
 107.  Cf. Guidance, supra note 88, ¶ 87 (recognizing that proposed rules and regula-
tions may prevent companies from innovating or bringing their services to the market). 
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consumers of innovative products with no corresponding benefit to 
competition generally.108 
B.  The RDP Fails to Weigh Pro-Competitive Efficiencies Against Anti-
Competitive Harms 
At a common-sense level, there are significant efficiencies to let-
ting software writers decide what functions to include in their soft-
ware. The leading decision in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, Unit-
ed States v. Microsoft Corp.,109 captured this intuition that there are 
many valid reasons a programmer might include or exclude particular 
features and functions, including that “integration of new functionali-
ty into platform software is a common practice,”110 and integration “is 
common among firms without market power.”111  That a practice is 
common among firms without market power is strong evidence that 
the practice has efficiencies, rather than generally being an attempt to 
lock-in or otherwise exercise market power.112 
The RDP, as drafted, creates a per se rule against software that 
lacks an EIM.113  The provider cannot defend itself by saying that its 
practices improve competition and are more efficient than they would 
be if it followed the RDP requirements.  Competition law, by contrast, 
uses a rule of reason rather than a per se rule, which allows deviations 
where significant efficiencies exist.114  E.U. competition law frowns on 
the use of a per se rule in the area of exclusionary practices, such as 
                                                          
 108.  As with other regulatory requirements, an additional concern is that established 
companies that become experts in the regulations will use them to their own competitive 
advantage.  For instance, the RDP might enable a major company to complain when a 
smaller company is not complying with the RDP.  In this way, the large player can impose 
regulatory burdens on smaller competitors, and also in this case perhaps require the 
smaller competitor to shift data to the large company.  Such mandated shifts in data from 
smaller to larger companies can actually reinforce problems of competition in the market. 
 109.  253 F.3d 34 (2001). 
 110.  Id. at 95. 
 111.  Id. at 93. 
 112.  See id. at 86–87 (reasoning that firms without market power tend to buy “bundled” 
goods and services, as opposed to buying those services separately, because it is more effi-
cient, not because the bundled goods are the only option available). 
 113.  See supra Part I.B.1. 
 114.  FATUR, supra note 20, at 162. 
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an alleged lock-in.115  Additionally, as the D.C. Circuit explained in its 
Microsoft decision, “[i]t is only after considerable experience with cer-
tain business relationships that courts classify them as per se viola-
tions.”116  Adopting a per se rule for what software is included in a 
product “creates undue risks of error and of deterring welfare-
enhancing innovation.”117 
As discussed in this Section, a per se rule would likely create sig-
nificant inefficiencies for current software providers by requiring 
them to create an EIM for software covered by the RDP.  Creating an 
EIM could be costly for both SMEs and larger providers.  Writing in-
teroperable software is more challenging than it may seem.118  A per se 
rule would also harm dynamic efficiency—the efficiency of the market 
over time.119  The ability to attract users to a software service, and keep 
them there in at least some instances, is an important incentive for 
innovation and new entrants.120  Additionally, and ironically, the RDP 
as drafted may create incentives for software providers to actually re-
duce their use of commonly accepted standards. 
1.  Static Efficiency and the Cost and Difficulty of Achieving 
Interoperability 
The RDP mandates that covered software include an EIM by re-
quiring that the data subject be able to get covered data “without hin-
drance” from the first party.121  As many readers have likely experi-
enced in their own lives, it is often difficult to get two software 
                                                          
 115.  See, e.g., C-468/06 to C-478/06, Sot. Lelos Kai Sia EE v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE 
Farmakeftikon Proionton, 2008 E.C.R. I-07139, ¶ 62 (“For both legal and economic rea-
sons, Article 82 EC [the provision governing exclusionary practices] is not appropriate to 
govern conduct branded as abusive per se.”). 
 116.  Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 84 (alteration in original) (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. 
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)). 
 117.  Id. at 89–90.  Tying law in the E.U., similar to U.S. law, recognizes that “serious 
errors can be made if such [tying] practices are condemned as anti-competitive without a 
thorough analysis and balancing of legitimate production purposes and anti-competitive 
effects.”  FATUR, supra note 20, at 162.  In fact, “the Commission explicitly confirmed its 
intention to apply the rule of reason type of analysis to tying and bundling cases.”  Id. at 
162. 
 118.  Shah & Kesan, supra note 31, at 143. 
 119.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 120.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 121.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18, at 53. 
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programs to interoperate smoothly.122  Interoperability is a problem 
for even the most sophisticated of organizations.  “Even the interna-
tionally respected Mayo Clinic, which treats more than a million pa-
tients a year, has serious unresolved problems after working for years 
to get its three major electronic records systems to talk to one anoth-
er.”123  In assessing the efficiency of the RDP, the costs of creating the 
EIM should be weighed against the benefits of the RDP. 
The cost and difficulty of achieving interoperability is highlight-
ed in a recent study by Professors Rajiv Shah and Jay Kesan that as-
sessed the effects of open standard document formats on interopera-
bility.124  The authors examined interoperability for the 
OpenDocument Format (“ODF”) and other alternatives to Microsoft’s 
proprietary DOC format.125  Their study showed “very significant is-
sues with interoperability” between existing document formats.126  
More specifically, “[t]he best implementations may result in format-
ting problems, while the worst implementations actually lose infor-
mation contained in pictures, footnotes, comments, tracking changes, 
and tables.”127 
This finding of the difficulty of interoperability suggests im-
portant lessons for interoperability and the RDP.  First, the study con-
sidered an internationally recognized and widely supported open 
standard, ODF.128  This sort of open standard for word processing 
would presumably meet Article 18’s definition of an “electronic and 
structured format which is commonly used.”129  Thus, Shah and 
                                                          
 122.  See PALFREY & GASSER, INTEROP, supra note 61, at 21-22 (discussing a common in-
teroperability problem between a Mac and a projector). 
 123.  Milt Freudenheim, The Ups and Downs of Electronic Medical Records, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
9, 2012, at D4. 
 124.  See Shah & Kesan, supra note 31, at 121 (discussing how OpenDocument Format 
and OpenOffice.org combine to create a program that is not limited to one software ven-
dor). 
 125.  Id. at 119. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  See OPENDOCUMENT FORMAT, http://opendocumentformat.org/ (last visited Nov. 
12, 2012) (“OpenDocument Format (or ODF for short) is the worlds [sic] leading docu-
ment standard as maintained by the Organization for the Advancement of Structured In-
formation Standards (OASIS), and was first adopted as an international standard in 
2005.”). 
 129.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1), at 53. 
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Kesan’s experience with ODF is relevant to the likely experience with 
other open standards going forward.  Second, the study applied to 
major software products with large numbers of users.130  Google Docs, 
for instance, had around four million users at the time of the study,131 
but the study found significant interoperability lapses by Google 
Docs.132  Third, the study applied to software producers that had 
strong commercial incentives to achieve interoperability.  Google 
Docs, for example, is a major strategic investment by a leading com-
pany trying to gain market share in the large market for word pro-
cessing software.133 
This study, in short, supports the idea that interoperability may 
well be costly and difficult to achieve.134  The requirement of interop-
erability could impose high costs on small companies relative to the 
size of their market.  Even for major software programs, supported by 
large companies with strong commercial incentives, the study found 
significant issues of interoperability.135  Especially if the first party has 
a responsibility to make sure that interoperability works with a range 
of second parties, then there may be serious feasibility concerns about 
the extent to which the RDP can be achieved in practice.  This sort of 
mandate goes well beyond what is required by competition law.136  At a 
minimum, regulators should not assume that interoperability is easy 
and inexpensive to achieve. 
                                                          
 130.  Shah & Kesan, supra note 31, at 119 (explaining that their study of ODF interop-
erability included popular software programs such as Microsoft Office, Wordperfect, and 
Google Docs). 
 131.  Catone, supra note 70. 
 132.  Shah & Kesan, supra note 31, at 133–34 (finding that Google Docs had “significant 
problems correctly reading the test documents” in the interoperability study). 
 133.  See Catone, supra note 70 (noting that Google Docs is trying to compete with Mi-
crosoft Word for customers). 
 134.  See Shah & Kesan, supra note 31, at 136, 143 (failing to find 100 percent interoper-
ability between the commonly used document formats and noting that achieving interop-
erability might involve costly updates and testing). 
 135.  Id. at 136. 
 136.  See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, Refusals to Deal and Price Squeezes by an Unregulated, Vertical-
ly Integrated Monopolist, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 709, 735 (2010) (“If the firm lacks the technical 
ability to supply an entrant, then the refusal to supply clearly would be permitted.”). 
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2.  Dynamic Efficiency and a Reduced Incentive to Use Standards and 
to Innovate 
Along with current costs of creating an EIM, the RDP can have 
significant effects on dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare over 
time.  First, the RDP creates one especially perverse incentive.  The 
Paragraph 1 requirements about providing a copy of personal data 
apply only to companies that process data “in an electronic and struc-
tured format which is commonly used.”137  Based on the language of 
the Draft Regulation, companies can avoid the need to write an EIM if 
they decide not to use electronic and structured formats.  Ironically, 
this measure designed to increase interoperability thus could lead 
companies to reduce their use of the standard formats that foster in-
teroperability.138  With an increase in the use of non-structured for-
mats, the RDP may exacerbate current data lock-in problems—
precisely the opposite of the intended effect. 
Second, and more broadly, a major consideration in achieving 
consumer welfare is how to create incentives for innovation.139  Con-
sumers flock to new services, such as social networks, and new devices, 
such as smartphones.  A principal task of antitrust law for the infor-
mation and communications technology (“ICT”) sector is how to fos-
ter continued innovation.140 
Proponents of the RDP and of interoperability generally make 
the case that greater interoperability will lead to more innovation.141  
The idea is that there will be less lock-in, and the second players will 
be able to offer new products and services once portability increases 
and switching costs are reduced: “One of the reasons why we tend to 
like interoperability is that we believe it leads to innovation, as well as 
other positive things like consumer choice, ease of use, and competi-
tion.”142 
This sort of increased innovation by second players can certainly 
occur.  Mandated interoperability, however, can also reduce innova-
                                                          
 137.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1), at 53. 
 138.  Thanks to Howard Beales for suggesting this point. 
 139.  See FATUR, supra note 20, at 178 (“[T]he core issue with regard to imposing a duty 
to deal is balancing short-run gains in efficiency with long-run incentives to invest and 
compete dynamically, which should be done on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  See, e.g., PALFREY & GASSER, INTEROP, supra note 61, at 11–12. 
 142.  Gasser & Palfrey, Breaking Down, supra note 61, at ii. 
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tion.143  In addition to the cost of writing an EIM, there will be lower 
expected returns to a new entrant whose business plan is based at 
least in part on not fully sharing the data provided by the consumer.144  
This sort of potential first player will have lower expected profits if 
there is lower consumer stickiness to their platform. 
Resolving this tradeoff between innovation by first players and 
second players is a complex task.145  Our main point here is that this 
complexity supports a rule of reason approach, based on the charac-
teristics of a particular market, rather than the per se approach of the 
RDP.  Although market structures vary considerably, important as-
pects of ICT industries suggest that a rule that mandates interopera-
bility will often reduce innovation.146  In general, a major theme of in-
novation theory is the Schumpeterian idea of creative destruction.147  
Dynamic competition in the technology space has resulted in “succes-
sive waves of creative destruction.”148  For example, MySpace replaced 
Friendster as the dominant social network, only for Facebook to later 
usurp MySpace’s position as the market leader.149 
                                                          
 143.  See FATUR, supra note 20, at 81 (“The right to exclude ensures that successful inno-
vators can recover their sunk costs and receive a return that compensates them for the 
risk.”). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  The debate about interoperability is structurally similar to longstanding debates in 
the intellectual property area.  Owners of patents and copyrights argue that they need 
strong intellectual property rights in order to create incentives for the first players, who 
are the owners of such rights.  Yochai Benkler, Brett Frischmann, and other scholars em-
phasize the importance of the second players, who make fair use of copyrights or other-
wise innovate based on narrower property rights.  See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE 
WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006); BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL 
VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES (2012).  We do not take sides in this general debate about 
the scope of intellectual property rights; instead, the point here is that there are complex, 
situation-dependent considerations about what is likely to create optimal overall innova-
tion, considering effects on both first players and second players.  Copyright and other in-
tellectual property law is very complex—we should not expect a simple rule of mandated 
interoperability to best cover the full range of market structures. 
 146.  FATUR, supra note 20, at 81. 
 147.  Id. at 72; see also Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L. 
REV. 1771, 1800 (2012) (explaining that Schumpeterian competition consists of “one dom-
inant firm being replaced by another, and then yet another dominant firm”). 
 148.  Waller, supra note 147, at 1801. 
 149.  Id. 
  
2013] RIGHT TO DATA PORTABILITY 359 
Many technology markets have the basic feature that one player 
gets a lead and then becomes a market leader, often with a large mar-
ket share.150  Economists have at least three related names for this 
phenomenon: first-mover advantage (an early entrant can gain signif-
icant market share),151 network effects (where the usefulness of a 
product to one user increases as the number of other users increas-
es),152 and tipping effect (where one seller gets enough of a lead on 
competitors that the market tips to a very large market share).153  Paul 
Geroski has described the phenomenon of competition for the mar-
ket, rather than the traditional competition in a market.154  He writes: 
“[I]nnovative entry involves producing new products or services, and, 
for this reason it usually also involves a different business design.”155  
Such entry is costly and risky.156  If there is a rule, such as the RDP, 
that reduces the profitability of such entry, then we can expect a lower 
amount of innovation in those new business designs. 
Competition law encourages technical innovation that creates 
dynamic efficiency.157  As Judge Learned Hand explained, “[t]he suc-
cessful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be 
turned upon when he wins.”158  As discussed in more detail below, 
competition law compensates successful innovators for the develop-
ment risk by generally giving them the right to exclude competitors 
from their assets.159  A per se mandate of the RDP cuts against this 
basic principle of competition law, and will tend to reduce innovation 
where there is competition for the market. 
Depending on the breadth of the RDP, Article 18 can specifically 
reduce investment by first parties in innovative data products.  One 
example of an innovative first party is Angie’s List, which since 1996 
has compiled reliable reviews about service providers ranging from 
                                                          
 150.  FATUR, supra note 20, at 85–86. 
 151.  Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 
CALIF. L. REV. 479, 495 (1998). 
 152.  Id. at 483. 
 153.  Id. at 505. 
 154.  P.A. Geroski, Competition in Markets and Competition for Markets, 3 J. INDUS., 
COMPETITION, & TRADE 151, 162 (2003). 
 155.  Id. at 163. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 158.  United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 159.  See FATUR, supra note 20, at 81. 
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plumbers to doctors.160  Angie’s List, unlike its competitors, ensures 
trusted reviews by not accepting anonymous reviews and only count-
ing reviews from active members.161  If a second player can force com-
panies such as Angie’s List to transfer valuable customer data “without 
hindrance,” then there is a reduced incentive to innovate and com-
pile unique data.  Under the RDP as currently drafted, future compa-
nies like Angie’s List that benefit millions of consumers may never get 
started. 
There are thus plausible precompetitive justifications, including 
incentives for innovations, for services that do not provide an EIM.  
The D.C. Circuit feared that “per se rules might stunt valuable innova-
tion” by “not giv[ing] newly integrated products a fair shake.”162  Un-
der the rule of reason approach, companies can prove that efficiency 
justifications outweigh competitive harm caused by restricting data 
transfers.163  Under the per se approach of RDP, companies may de-
cide not to engage in risky investments in innovation because of lower 
expected returns. 
C.  Failure to Write an EIM Is Generally Not Exclusionary Conduct 
Under Competition Law 
In the discussion of competition law thus far, we have started 
with points that we thought would be intuitive to readers whose main 
field is not antitrust—market power is needed before competition law 
intervenes, and there are likely important static and dynamic efficien-
cies to allowing software companies to decide what functions to in-
clude in their products and services.  We now turn to the somewhat 
more technical discussion of when competition law will find exclu-
sionary conduct—the sort of action to exclude a competitor, such as a 
second party seeking to use data, that will trigger scrutiny under com-
petition law. 
The alleged exclusionary act at issue is lack of interoperability, or 
failure to write an EIM.  Competition law could characterize, or de-
scribe, the decision of a software company not to write an EIM in at 
least three related ways.  First, and most appropriately, the decision 
not to write an EIM might be described as what E.U. law calls “refusal 
                                                          
 160.  ANGIE’S LIST, http://www.angieslist.com/ (last accessed Oct. 4, 2012).  One au-
thor, Lagos, has worked for Angie’s List. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 163.  Id. at 92. 
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to supply” and U.S. antitrust law usually calls “refusal to deal.”164  Sec-
ond, the decision of the first party might violate the essential facilities 
doctrine, which is a type of refusal to supply.165  Third, the decision of 
the first party might be considered an anticompetitive tying arrange-
ment, on the theory that the software service is foreclosing competi-
tion by tying its offering with a non-interoperable software module.166 
Our view is that failure to supply an EIM would typically comply 
with competition law under any of these theories.  Competition law 
starts with a presumption that companies have freedom to decide with 
whom they will deal.167  In a 2004 case, Verizon Communications Inc. v. 
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,168 the Supreme Court of the United 
States discussed “the few existing exceptions from the proposition 
that there is no duty to aid competitors.”169  E.U. courts similarly re-
quire a showing of exceptional circumstances when examining a re-
fusal to supply.  In addition to holding a dominant position in the 
primary market, the European Commission has announced three en-
forcement priorities for a refusal to supply claim: “the refusal relates 
to a product or service that is objectively necessary to be able to com-
pete effectively on a downstream market, the refusal is likely to lead to 
the elimination of effective competition on the downstream market, 
and the refusal is likely to lead to consumer harm.”170  In its 2007 deci-
sion, Microsoft v. Commission,171 the E.U. Court of First Instance stated 
that three conditions are needed to meet the “exceptional” require-
ments for proving a refusal to supply: 
[I]n the first place, the refusal relates to a product or service 
indispensable to the exercise of a particular activity on a 
                                                          
 164.  See Guidance, supra note 88, ¶ 75–90, at 18; Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices 
of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408–09 (2004). 
 165.  Trinko, 540 U.S at 410. 
 166.  See Guidance, supra note 88, ¶¶ 47–62, at 15–16. 
 167.  In U.S. antitrust law, this presumption derives from the oft-cited Supreme Court 
statement in United States v. Colgate & Co., where the Court stated: “In the absence of any 
purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman] act does not restrict the long 
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300, 307 (1919). 
 168.  540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 169.  Id. at 411. 
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neighbouring market; in the second place, the refusal is of 
such a kind as to exclude any effective competition on that 
neighbouring market; in the third place, the refusal prevents 
the appearance of a new product for which there is potential 
consumer demand.172 
The threshold for showing a refusal to supply is thus clearly 
much higher than for finding a violation under Article 18.  For in-
stance, refusal to supply applies only to something “indispensable” to 
a neighboring market, and the refusal must “exclude any effective 
competition” for that other market.173  The Commission also expects 
to enforce the Regulation only where the refusal leads to consumer 
harm, and the analysis here has shown multiple respects where the 
RDP is instead likely to create consumer harm as understood in com-
petition law.174 
The concept of essential facilities is closely related to the idea of 
refusal to supply.175  This idea of essential facilities might seem like a 
good fit with the RDP: The data subject and the second party might 
need access to the data held by the first party to bring competition to 
markets that rely on that data.  The essential facilities doctrine, how-
ever, has experienced serious criticism from scholars and the United 
States Supreme Court.176  Even advocates for the essential facilities 
doctrine, moreover, would apply it in far more restrictive circum-
stances than contemplated by the RDP.  For instance, former FTC 
Chairman Robert Pitofsky has written in support of the doctrine, in 
connection with a 2002 E.U. competition case.177  He writes: 
[T]o establish antitrust liability under the essential facilities 
doctrine, a party must prove four factors: (1) control of the 
essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor’s inability 
                                                          
 172.  Id. ¶ 332, at 3726. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  See supra Part II.A–B. 
 175.  Mats A. Bergman, The Role of the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 
403, 413 (2001). 
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practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; 
(3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and 
(4) the feasibility of providing the facility to competitors.178 
These factors are much stricter than Article 18.  The factors re-
quire a finding of monopoly, and there must be a “denial of the use 
of the facility,” which is a greater degree of exclusionary conduct than 
simply a failure to write an EIM.179  Furthermore, the owner of the fa-
cility has the opportunity to dispute whether the access is feasible,180 
the sort of efficiencies argument that is applied under a rule of rea-
son.  Similarly, scholars such as Brett Frischmann and Spencer Waller, 
who write in favor of open access principles and the essential facilities 
doctrine, would require a high threshold before applying the doc-
trine.181 
Along with refusal to supply or essential facilities, one might 
characterize the RDP as preventing a tying arrangement.  One might 
believe that the first party is tying its product, such as a social network, 
to a tied product, the software that governs export of data.  The anal-
ogy is not precise—generally there is no separate product for an EIM.  
The idea of a tie, however, may be useful in suggesting that there 
could be an obligation of the first party to tie its product to an EIM 
that provides portability rather than to an EIM that lacks portability. 
As with the other alleged exclusionary conduct, however, Article 
18 is much stricter than the conclusions about tying that competition 
law has arrived at after years of analysis and case law.  In finding that 
Microsoft had in fact illegally tied Windows Media Player with the 
Windows operating system, the E.U. Court of First Instance set forth 
the factors needed to prove a tying violation.182  The court first re-
quired that the tying and tied products be two separate products,183 
which is not the case with a software service and its EIM.  Second, the 
                                                          
 178.  Id. at 5-6; see also MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1082, 
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in the case). 
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court analyzed whether “the undertaking concerned is dominant in 
the market for the tying product.”184  Once again, competition law on-
ly steps in to protect consumer welfare where there is dominant mar-
ket power, in contrast to Article 18.  Third, the court analyzed wheth-
er “the undertaking concerned does not give customers a choice to 
obtain the tying product without the tied product.”185  Although a first 
party may not create an EIM that operates “without hindrance,” cus-
tomers retain the legal and often practical ability to export their data 
to a different online service.  Fourth, the court analyzed whether “the 
practice in question forecloses competition.”186  This factor allows a 
court to consider the dynamic effects on the market; as discussed in 
Part II.B.2, these dynamic factors may well favor less of an RDP than 
Article 18 provides.  In addition, the court analyzed Microsoft’s pro-
posed objective justification for its product decision: the possibility 
that its conduct had efficiencies or was justified by reasons other than 
an intent to dominate the market.187  The Court did not find such an 
objective justification in the facts of that case.188  Under the different 
facts of the leading Microsoft decision in the United States, the D.C. 
Circuit eloquently discussed the reasons to give software providers 
flexibility in deciding what features and functions to include in a 
product: “[I]ntegration of new functionality into platform software is 
a common practice,” and integration “is common among firms with-
out market power.”189 
In conclusion on competition law, exclusionary practices trigger 
enforcement only where there is a particularized showing in a specific 
market of harm to consumers.190  Competition law acts only where 
there is strong market power, and efficiencies and other justifications 
can be given to justify behavior that otherwise may appear exclusion-
ary.191  This accumulated wisdom and experience in competition law, 
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designed to address lock-in effects and high switching costs, is differ-
ent in numerous respects from the Draft Regulation’s text for Article 
18.  It thus appears difficult to justify the current text on the basis of 
lock-in or other competition law concerns. 
III.  THE RDP AND PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL PRIVACY RIGHTS 
The previous Part concluded that the proposed RDP is not a 
good fit with E.U. and U.S. competition law.  Another major rationale 
for the RDP is that it protects individual rights in data protection.  
Among the brief mentions of the RDP in the Draft Regulation, the 
following is most on point: “As a precondition and in order to further 
improve access of individuals to their personal data, [the RDP] pro-
vides the right to obtain from the controller those data in a structured 
and commonly used electronic format.”192 
This part of the Essay critically evaluates the proposal to recog-
nize a new right to obtain personal data in a structured and common-
ly used electronic format.  In considering the claimed individual 
right, we repeat our statement from the Introduction that the idea of 
data portability is appealing.193  We hope that it will be implemented 
as good practice in a range of settings, and we note that major online 
services have improved data portability over time.194  The discussion 
here, however, is how to assess a claimed right of data portability, as 
implemented in laws such as the proposed Article 18. 
In assessing this claim, we briefly examine the extent to which 
the RDP should qualify as a “human right” or “fundamental right” in 
the context of global human rights jurisprudence generally and E.U. 
law more specifically.195  Whatever sort of right may be implicated, the 
process for defining the RDP appears to essentially be normal legisla-
tion and regulation rather than constitutional deliberation.196  The 
definition of the RDP should be based on democratic policy-making 
rather than rights jurisprudence.  Next, the discussion shows how the 
RDP differs substantially from the pre-existing E.U. right of access, in 
ways that make the former more than a routine variation on the lat-
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ter.197  Finally, the proposed right raises serious risks for another prin-
ciple of data protection law: protecting the security of an individual’s 
personal data. In our world of weak authentication and rampant iden-
tity theft, moving all of a person’s data to another system “without 
hindrance” creates security risks that can outweigh the portability 
benefits.198 
A.  The RDP’s Uncertain Status Under Human Rights and Fundamental 
Rights Jurisprudence 
To determine whether the RDP is justified on the basis of indi-
vidual rights, it is helpful to clarify the meaning of “fundamental 
rights” within E.U. law, as contrasted with human rights jurisprudence 
more generally, or constitutional rights as understood in the United 
States.  At least for U.S.-trained lawyers, such as the authors, the pro-
cess for defining a new “fundamental” right in the E.U. appears much 
closer to standard legislation and regulation than it is to a new consti-
tutional provision. 
It is well beyond the scope of this Essay to provide a full discus-
sion of how to identify a new human right.  Drawing on the work of 
noted moral philosopher Joseph Raz, however, there are reasons to 
be cautious in concluding that the RDP should qualify. In two recent 
articles, Raz critiques the practice of multiplying the number of hu-
man rights.199  He states: “An ever growing number of rights are 
claimed to be human rights” and lists numerous examples, such as a 
right to globalization, the right to comprehensive sexual education, 
and a right to a secure, healthy, and ecologically sound environ-
ment.200  The range of the newly claimed rights should encourage 
caution before accepting each newly asserted right.  Raz notes that 
“philosophers tend to take it for granted that human rights are im-
portant rights.”201  He also emphasizes that a key function of human 
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rights is to define conditions that are so serious that violations justify 
international intervention.202  Compared to protection against geno-
cide or other rights that justify international intervention, a right to 
portability in data does not seem to be at the same level of im-
portance. 
Instead of this sort of human right, however, the Draft Regula-
tion contemplates that the RDP would be a “fundamental” right, as 
part of the well-developed jurisprudence in the E.U. about fundamen-
tal rights in the area of data protection.203  In the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (“ECHR”), issued in 1950, Article 8 established 
the right for respect of “private and family life.”204  Courts have under-
stood Article 8 to include the protection of personal data.205  The 
Treaty of the European Union (“TEU”), which became effective in 
1993, states: “Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the [ECHR] and 
as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Mem-
ber States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.”206  
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), 
which supplements the TEU, provides: “Everyone has the right to the 
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protection of personal data concerning them.”207  These provided the 
basis for the Data Protection Directive of 1995,208 and for the Draft 
Regulation proposed in 2012.209 
Compared with the U.S. procedures for creating a new constitu-
tional right, which requires amending the Constitution, the E.U. pro-
cedures for defining data protection rights are substantially closer to 
ordinary legislation and regulation.  Under U.S. law, an amendment 
to the Constitution requires a strict super-majority process, typically 
with two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives and then 
ratification by three-quarters of the states.210  By contrast, the right to 
protection of personal data under Article 16 of the TFEU is defined 
and subject to modification by the “European Parliament and the 
Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure” 
of the E.U.211  The Draft Regulation states that it is based on Article 16 
of the TFEU,212 and thus proceeds under ordinary legislative proce-
dure.  In addition, Paragraph 3 of Article 18 of the Draft Regulation 
delegates a large portion of the details of defining the RDP to the 
Commission.213 
The discussion here shows that the procedure for defining a new 
“fundamental” right within the E.U. is different from defining a new 
human right that justifies international intervention, or a new consti-
tutional right in the U.S., which requires a difficult-to-enact super-
majority vote.214  The existence and scope of the RDP is defined by 
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“the ordinary legislative procedure.”215  There are vital issues of hu-
man dignity and freedom involved in defining fundamental rights, 
but there is no pre-existing constitution or other text that inevitably 
dictates how fundamental rights will be shaped in the regulatory pro-
cess.216  The definition of a new right in the area of data portability is 
legitimately open to factual and policy debates that inform “the ordi-
nary legislative procedure.”217  Efforts to understand the new pro-
posed RDP, and critique it where necessary, should be addressed on 
the merits, and not by a simple assertion that fundamental rights are 
involved and so discussion is at an end. 
B.  The RDP Goes Well Beyond the Existing E.U. Right of Access 
European legal instruments such as the Data Protection Directive 
issued in 1995 provide individuals a right to access their personal da-
ta.218  The access right in that directive included “communication to 
[the individual] in an intelligible form of the data undergoing pro-
cessing.”219  The Draft Regulation says that the RDP is included “[a]s a 
precondition and in order to further improve access of individuals to 
their personal data.”220  Our view, however, is that the new require-
ments in Article 18 are not a precondition for the access right and in 
fact go quite far beyond existing access requirements. 
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As discussed above, Paragraph 1 of Article 18 in many cases pro-
vides the right to obtain data “in an electronic and structured format 
which is commonly used and allows for further use by the data sub-
ject.”221  Note that the old access requirement of communication “in 
an intelligible form”222  expands to a requirement under the RDP that 
the format be electronic and structured, and allow for further use by 
the data subject.223  Paragraph 2 further requires information in an 
automated processing system to be provided “in an electronic format 
which is commonly used, without hindrance” from the entity operat-
ing the system.224 
The RDP differs in at least two important ways from the previous 
right of access.  First, data protection regulators have previously stated 
that controllers could work with the data subject to narrow an access 
request.225  For instance, in response to a request that an individual 
get all data about herself, the controller could speak with the individ-
ual to determine what specific information the individual was seek-
ing.226  This ability to define the scope of a request is considerably less 
burdensome on the controller than the requirement to provide all of 
an individual’s personal data through an automated process, and to 
do so “without hindrance.”227  Second, data protection regulators have 
previously made clear that the right of access did not require the con-
troller to create a computer system in advance to give automatic re-
sponses to access requests.228  By contrast, the RDP appears to require 
                                                          
 221.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1), at 53. 
 222.  Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 17, art. 12, at 42. 
 223.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(1), at 53. 
 224.  Id. art. 18(2), at 53. 
 225.  Data Protection Good Practice Note: Checklist for Handling Requests for Personal Infor-
mation (Subject Access Requests), INFO. COMM’R’S OFFICE (2007), http://www.ico.gov.uk/ 
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 227.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(2), at 53. 
 228.  See Subject Access Requests: How Do I Respond?, INFO. COMM’R’S OFFICE, 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/data_protection/subject_access_requests.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (explaining that data controllers have up to forty days to re-
spond to a request).  Data Protection Act, ch. 29, pt. II, §§ 7(8), 7(10) (1998) (stating that 
“a data controller shall comply with a request under this section promptly and in any event 
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creation of the EIM in advance, so that data can automatically be ex-
ported from a system the controller must build for that purpose.229 
Not only are the requirements of the RDP different from those 
for the right of access, but the Draft Regulation itself provides support 
for the idea that the RDP is a new right that is distinct from, and goes 
beyond, the right of access.  At a formal level, Section 2 of the Draft 
Regulation is entitled “Information and Access to Data,”230 and con-
tains Article 15, entitled “Right of access for the data subject.”231  Sep-
arately, Section 3 is entitled “Rectification and Erasure,”232 and Article 
18 the “Right to data portability.”233  The fact that the RDP is in a dif-
ferent section of the Draft Regulation and has a different name is evi-
dence that the RDP is not merely a small modification to the existing 
right to access.234 
The way the term “data portability” is used in other contexts fur-
ther shows the gap between data portability and the E.U. definition of 
the right of access.  Notably, the Data Portability Project was created 
                                                          
before the end of the prescribed period beginning with the relevant day” and “the pre-
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 229.  See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 230.  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 2, at 48. 
 231.  Id. art. 15, at 50–51. 
 232.  Id. § 3, at 51. 
 233.  Id. art. 18, at 53. 
 234.  Moreover, publicity materials produced by the E.U. delineate between mere access 
and data portability. See Fact Sheet: Why Do We Need an EU Data Protection Reform?, EUROPEAN 
COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/factsheets 
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fer of personal data from one service provider to another”).  The European Commission 
also released a fact sheet on how data protection reform strengthens citizens’ rights.  Fact 
Sheet: How Does the Data Protection Reform Strengthen Citizens’ Rights?, EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/factsheets/2_en.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2012).  According to the fact sheet: 
The Commission also wants to guarantee free and easy access to your personal 
data, making it easier for you to see what personal information is held about you 
by companies and public authorities, and make it easier for you to transfer your 
personal data between service providers—the so-called principle of “data porta-
bility.” 
Id. 
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in 2007,235 and incorporated in the U.S. as a non-profit in 2009.236  A 
major effort of the project has been a series of ten model questions 
issued in 2010 “that sites can answer to explain how people can bring 
data in and take it out.”237  The questions promote transparency, so 
that an organization can clearly communicate its policies and practic-
es to the public.238  The ten questions cover a diverse set of issues, in-
cluding the creation of a new identity on the site, the ability to import 
data to the site, and whether there is automatic updating for actions 
taken on other sites.239 
Two aspects of the project’s model questions are relevant to our 
comparison of the right of access and the meaning of data portability.  
First, the project clearly states that it does not believe there are cor-
rect answers to the questions, and that the model questions promote 
transparency rather than dictate practices.240  Second, quite a few of 
the questions, such as the identity and updating questions just noted, 
address issues other than those covered by the longstanding E.U. def-
inition of the right of access.241 
The meaning of any right to data portability is still in the early 
stages of development, and the ten questions asked by the Data Port-
ability Project differ substantially from the E.U. right of access.  In 
short, the RDP is substantially different from the pre-existing right of 
access in E.U. law.  If the RDP is included within E.U. law as a funda-
mental right, it should be recognized as a distinct and new right.242 
                                                          
 235.  Elias Bizannes, History of the Project, DATAPORTABILITY PROJECT (Mar. 21, 2009), 
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 237.  Elias Bizannes, Why Every Site Should Have a Data Portability Policy, TECHCRUNCH 
(June 23, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/06/23/data-portability-policy/. 
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 239.  Id. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id.; see also supra notes 218–219 and accompanying text; Data Protection Act, ch. 
29, pt. II, § 7 (1998) (defining the “Right of access to Personal Data”). 
 242.  One additional issue in defining the RDP is how to address the substantial number 
of exceptions under E.U. law to the right of access.  See, e.g., Helping U.S. Companies Export, 
INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018380.asp (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2012) (outlining the various exceptions for right to access).  Where access re-
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The new right to data portability appears more closely akin to the 
personal data ownership theory—“attaching property rights to per-
sonal information.”243  The ability to transfer information “without 
hindrance” gives users ownership over their information.  The idea 
that personal information is property has been widely debated,244 with 
some questioning whether personal data ownership has “compatibility 
with the European Legal System.”245 “So far, personal information has 
not been deemed ‘property’ . . . in the EU.”246 
We do not take a position for or against the personal data owner-
ship theory or the right to data portability as a fundamental right.  In-
stead, we simply point out that the lack of consensus suggests that the 
norms for data portability have not been established.247  It is risky to 
create a new fundamental right before there is general agreement of 
the norms defining that right. 
C.  The RDP Is in Tension with an Individual’s Right of Data Security 
Within the framework of the E.U.’s existing fundamental right to 
data protection, a new right to data portability is in significant tension 
with the individual’s existing right to data security.248  With the RDP, 
one-time access to a site, such as by a hacker, can turn into a lifetime’s 
download of data from that site.  Defining the RDP, therefore, should 
be done with full awareness of risks to the right to data security.  Un-
                                                          
quests are made one at a time, and the controller can speak with the data subject to define 
the request, then the controller can apply the exceptions where appropriate.  Cf. supra 
notes 225–226 and accompanying text (explaining how a request for information could be 
narrowed).  By contrast, it may take a considerable amount of regulatory definition and 
software effort to build each access exception into a new RDP, so that a person’s records 
are exported “without hindrance.”  Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 18(2), at 53. 
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 246.  Krebs, supra note 243, at 38. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  Security of processing data is guaranteed by Article 17 of the 1995 Data Protection 
Directive, and Article 30 of the 2012 Draft Regulation.  Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra 
note 17, art. 17, at 43; Draft Regulation, supra note 1, art. 30, at 60. 
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fortunately, Article 18 as drafted makes no mention of the right to da-
ta security. 
Security has long been recognized as an important issue when 
defining the ability of an individual to access data.249  The Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) in 1999 formed an advisory committee on 
Access and Security.250  The committee report recognized that “there 
is a very real tension between access and security.”251  Notably, “privacy 
is lost if a security failure results in access being granted to the wrong 
person—an investigator making a pretext call, a con man engaged in 
identity theft, or, in some instances, one family member in conflict 
with another.”252 
Security is a materially bigger risk with the RDP.  Before, access 
was often one-off, with the individual asking for particular infor-
mation and receiving a limited amount of data.253  With the RDP, an 
individual’s lifetime of data with a service can be downloaded all at 
once.254  The quantity of personal data at risk is therefore far greater.  
The affirmative requirement to create an EIM also means that the 
downloading is automated rather than the one-at-a-time responses to 
access requests that have been the norm to date.255  The Article 18 re-
quirement of downloading data “without hindrance” adds an addi-
tional layer of risk.256  This language could be interpreted to prohibit 
a site from double-checking a user’s identity if the request comes 
from a new IP address or otherwise appears to present a higher risk of 
identity fraud.257 
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Double-checking a user’s identity, however, is often appropriate 
before releasing large amounts of what may be sensitive data.  For 
online banking transactions, the Federal Financial Institutions Exam-
ination Council has emphasized the importance of a layered security 
system.258  Notably, banks often set a daily limit on online consumer 
transactions, such as $1000. That practice suggests the wisdom of con-
sidering something more cautious, at least for sensitive information, 
than an immediate transfer of all information without hindrance.  
Layered security in the banking industry includes other practices such 
as: out-of-band authentication before completing internet transac-
tions, sophisticated challenge questions, and suspicious activity detec-
tion.259  Similar techniques could prove instrumental in protecting 
consumer privacy in a world with the RDP. 
The 2000 FTC report stressed a key risk with online access: the 
lack of effective authentication on the Internet.260  This lack of good 
authentication continues today, precisely for the online services that 
are the main subject of the RDP.  A recent prominent example was 
when Wired reporter Mat Honen had much of his lifetime archive of 
files remotely wiped by a hacker.261  In that instance, the hacker ap-
peared to use “social engineering” to get into Honen’s account—the 
hacker persuaded the customer service representative to reset pass-
words and thereby give the hacker full access to Honen’s files.262 
Any individual right in the area of data portability should thus be 
considered together with the individual’s right for the data to be pro-
tected securely.  Fundamental rights to flow data more quickly should 
be considered together with fundamental rights to block access to 
those who are not entitled to get it.263 
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IV.  INTEROPERABILITY ITSELF AS A RATIONALE FOR THE RDP 
The previous Parts have responded to the claims that Article 18 
and the RDP are justified to address lock-in problems or protect the 
fundamental rights of the data subject.  As discussed above, there are 
serious questions that a broad version of the RDP is justified under ei-
ther competition or fundamental rights law.  One additional argu-
ment for the RDP is that there may be reasons to support interopera-
bility itself, apart from competition law or fundamental rights reasons.  
As we have stated throughout this Essay, we support interoperability 
in a wide range of settings.264  Our understanding of Article 18, how-
ever, is that the RDP as proposed is quite different from previous legal 
efforts to protect interoperability.  Proponents to date have not ad-
dressed this new aspect of the RDP, which places an affirmative man-
date on the first player to create an EIM, and thus differs from previ-
ous efforts to ensure that it is lawful for second players to build 
products that can operate with the first player. 
Apart from current doctrines of competition law or fundamental 
rights, interoperability itself might be a rationale for Article 18.  Some 
scholars, for instance, believe that competition law currently inade-
quately protects against abuses from dominant networks.265  Tim 
Berners-Lee, credited with inventing the World Wide Web,266 is a no-
table supporter of interoperability.  By increasing data flow between 
websites, he sees the potential for “unexpected, serendipitous re-use 
of data, that is, when somebody uses that information for a completely 
different purpose.”267  In their 2012 book Interop, John Palfrey and Urs 
Gasser write: “Interoperability should be an explicit goal in national 
and international discussions of business, law, and policy because the 
upsides of interoperability are massive: it fosters innovation and com-
petition, enhances diversity, gives consumers choice, and can lead to 
unexpected benefits over time.”268  For proponents of openness in 
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computing, interoperability is a desirable goal when it prevents social 
networks such as Twitter and LinkedIn from locking in users by giving 
them the right to transport their data from those networks.269 
One notable legal source that supports interoperability is the 
1995 Court of Appeals for the First Circuit opinion in Lotus Develop-
ment Corp. v. Borland International.270  In that case, the court held that 
Lotus could not use copyright to protect its menu command hierar-
chy—a type of interoperability information.271  Borland was thus per-
mitted to copy Lotus’s menu command hierarchy to build its own 
spreadsheet program.272  The case specifically interprets the U.S. cop-
yright law in a way that prevents the first party, Lotus, from blocking 
the second party, Borland.273  The case can also be viewed as con-
sistent with a broader message: The second party has and should have 
considerable freedom to find ways to write its own code so as to pro-
mote interoperability.  There is a major distinction, however, between 
this freedom of the second party and the RDP.  Article 18 imposes an 
affirmative mandate on the first party to write the EIM.274  This affirm-
ative obligation on the first party is a long step past the Lotus v. Bor-
land holding of freedom to act by the second party. 
European Union law on this point is similar.  The 1991 E.U. 
Computer Programs Directive provides a copyright exception that al-
lows second parties to first observe and study and then copy infor-
mation necessary to achieve interoperability with the first party’s 
product.275  As described by noted copyright scholar Pamela Samuel-
son, U.S. and E.U. law both provide “first, that interfaces necessary to 
interoperability may be unprotectable by copyright law, and secondly, 
that reverse engineering of computer programs, insofar as it is neces-
sary to discerning interface information, does not infringe software 
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copyrights.”276  As with Lotus v. Borland, E.U. law allows the second 
party to build upon interoperability information without fear of in-
fringing on the first party’s copyrights, as long as certain provisions 
are met.277  There is currently no requirement on the first party, how-
ever, to write an EIM to help the second party create interoperability. 
The concept of interoperability has an undeniable appeal: Con-
sumers will gain the ability to do new things and send data seamlessly 
to new products and services.278  At the same time, some major market 
trends suggest that consumers often prefer systems that are “walled 
gardens,” with limits on interoperability.279  Apple has achieved the 
largest market capitalization in the world precisely by offering prod-
ucts with limited interoperability.280  The iPhone initially allowed only 
Apple-developed apps.281  Today, its App Store places considerably 
more restrictions on app developers than the competing Android op-
erating system.282  In another example of a walled garden, Facebook 
retains restrictions on what apps are allowed on its platform.283  These 
restrictions can actually contribute to security and privacy, by reduc-
ing the risk that the apps will gain unwanted access to personal data.284  
In addition, other social networks, such as Twitter and Pinterest, have 
over time created Facebook apps that allow users to spread the 
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unique data compilations of those social networks through the Face-
book platform.285  These examples of consumer preference for and 
competitive cooperation within walled gardens suggest caution before 
enacting the RDP that uniformly imposes interoperability mandates 
on both small and large providers of online services. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Essay fills a surprisingly large gap in the debates about the 
proposed E.U. Data Protection Regulation.  The gap may exist in part 
because data portability is an attractive concept—we as consumers 
would like to be able to move “our” stuff from one system to anoth-
er.286  In addition, data portability is a proposed new fundamental 
human right,287 and many authors would rather support human rights 
than criticize them. 
The proposed Article 18, however, has serious flaws from both a 
competition and privacy perspective.288  Competition law in the E.U. 
and U.S. focuses on the welfare of consumers.289  As discussed here, 
however, the proposed RDP appears to reduce consumer welfare.290  
Interoperability is often hard to achieve, and the RDP would impose 
substantial costs on suppliers of software and apps, to write the soft-
ware to export data from one system “without hindrance” so that the 
data can be imported smoothly into a second system.291  The costs of 
this mandated code would be passed on to consumers.  As a matter of 
competition law, Article 18 is over-broad, applying to small enterpris-
es, to enterprises with no monopoly power, and to markets with no 
barriers to entry.292  More generally, Article 18 conflicts with the com-
petition law rules about exclusionary conduct; it creates a per se pro-
hibition where competition law would apply a rule of reason ap-
proach, considering efficiencies as well as possible harm to 
competition.293 
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The proposed Article 18 also suffers serious difficulties as a mat-
ter of data protection law.294  There is no well-defined or established 
right to data portability—no jurisdiction has experimented with any-
thing resembling the proposed Article 18, and the Draft Regulation 
would apply the new mandates to over half a billion residents of the 
European Union.295  Article 18 is explicitly drafted under standard 
legislative procedures rather than through some constitutional pro-
cess, and most of the important details are delegated down even fur-
ther to the Commission.296  These sorts of bureaucratic proceedings 
are not usually the source of a new fundamental human right.  In ad-
dition, Article 18 poses serious risks to a long-established E.U. funda-
mental right of data protection: the right to security of a person’s da-
ta.297  Previous access requests by individuals were limited in scope and 
format.298  By contrast, when an individual’s lifetime of data must be 
exported “without hindrance,” then one moment of identity fraud 
can turn into a lifetime breach of personal data. 
As authors writing in the United States, we are not close enough 
to negotiations about the Draft Regulation to know what changes may 
be feasible before the Regulation becomes final.  The goal instead has 
been to provide a thoughtful critique of the proposal.  In a final Reg-
ulation or subsequent Commission actions, we hope the competition 
and privacy critique provided here can inform decisions about how to 
foster the best possible information economy, for the benefit of con-
sumers and while reducing the likelihood of unexpected and negative 
consequences. 
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